{"answers":{"affected":"","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of PSF-2019-13 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for PSF-2019-13 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"PSF-2019-13 is a vulnerability, published on 1 Jul 2019. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for PSF-2019-13 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: PSF-2019-13 is a vulnerability, published on 1 Jul 2019. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of PSF-2019-13 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/PSF-2019-13/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/PSF-2019-13/index.md)","id":"PSF-2019-13","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/PSF-2019-13/index.md","name":"PSF-2019-13","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Python SSL library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Python's ssl.match_hostname incorrectly validates IPv4 addresses with trailing whitespace, potentially bypassing certificate checks in older versions.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"``inet_aton()`` accepts trailing characters after a valid IP.  Because of\nthat, Python ``ssl.match_hostname('1.1.1.1 ; this should not work but does')``\nsucceeded when it should fail.\n\nThe issue was introduced in `bpo-32819\n\u003chttps://bugs.python.org/issue32819\u003e`_ by `commit aef1283b\n\u003chttps://github.com/python/cpython/commit/aef1283ba428e33397d87cee3c54a5110861552d\u003e`_.\nOnly Python 3.7 and newer are affected. It's a potential security bug\nalthough **low severity**. For one Python 3.7 and newer **no longer use**\n``ssl.match_hostname()`` to verify hostnames and IP addresses of a\ncertificate: **matching is performed by OpenSSL**.\n\nIt should not possible to register a x509 certificate with a hostname with\nspaces.\n\nThe glibc function ``inet_aton()`` accepts input as valid if said input is\na IPv4 address followed by zero or more characters that are valid\nwhite-space as decided by ``isspace()``, with the rest of the string after\nthe first white-space being ignored. As ``'\\r'`` is a valid white-space\ncharacter the rest of the string is ignored (including the ``'\\r'``). See\n`glibc bug 24111: Deprecate inet_addr, inet_aton\n\u003chttps://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=24111\u003e`_.","ecosystems":[],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"ssl.match_hostname() ignores extra string after whitespace in IPv4 address","id":"PSF-2019-13","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":null,"product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2019"},"n_packages":0,"n_references":null,"packages":[],"products":null,"published":"2019-07-01","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"attribution","licence":"CC BY 4.0","name":"Python Software Foundation","prefix":"PSF"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Python's ssl.match_hostname incorrectly validates IPv4 addresses with trailing whitespace, potentially bypassing certificate checks in older versions.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/PSF-2019-13/"}