{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including libcrux-aesgcm.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0211 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for RUSTSEC-2026-0211 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"RUSTSEC-2026-0211 is a vulnerability in libcrux-aesgcm, published on 14 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for RUSTSEC-2026-0211 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: RUSTSEC-2026-0211 is a vulnerability in libcrux-aesgcm, published on 14 Jul 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0211 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- libcrux-aesgcm (crates.io): affected from 0.0.0-0; no fix listed\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0211/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0211/index.md)","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0211","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0211/index.md","name":"RUSTSEC-2026-0211","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_read","data_modify"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Rust AES-GCM library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Timing side-channel in AES-GCM tag check allows attackers to recover authentication tags and forge ciphertexts via decryption oracles.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"other"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"AES-GCM decryption used an implementation for checking the provided\nauthentication tag against the recomputed authentication tag that was\nintended to be constant-time, but resulted in non-constant-time code\ngeneration in certain circumstances.\nNote that `libcrux-aesgcm` does not give guarantees on constant-time\ncode generation and possible mitigations must be considered\non a best-effort basis.\n\n## Impact\nUsers of `libcrux-aesgcm` that expose a decryption oracle to an\nattacker, which allows repeatedly querying for the same ciphertext\nwere at risk from timing side-channel attacks, depending on their\ncompilation environment. In the worst case, this could lead to\nrecovery of the recomputed authentication tag by the attacker, which\nenables ciphertext forgery.\n\n## Mitigation\nStarting from version `0.0.9` (published as `libcrux-aes@v0.0.9`),\nAES-GCM decryption uses a different, best-effort constant-time\nimplementation of the tag check, which has been checked to reliably\nlead to constant time code generation, at the moment.","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Non-constant time Authentication Tag Check in AES-GCM Decryption","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0211","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"other","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":[],"introduced":["0.0.0-0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"libcrux-aesgcm","purl":"pkg:cargo/libcrux-aesgcm","source":"RUSTSEC-2026-0211"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-07-14","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"open","licence":"CC0 1.0","name":"RustSec","prefix":"RUSTSEC"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Timing side-channel in AES-GCM tag check allows attackers to recover authentication tags and forge ciphertexts via decryption oracles.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0211/"}