{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including nostr-relay-pool.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0224 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"Upgrade nostr-relay-pool to 0.44.2 or later.","what":"RUSTSEC-2026-0224 is a vulnerability in nostr-relay-pool, published on 1 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for RUSTSEC-2026-0224 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: RUSTSEC-2026-0224 is a vulnerability in nostr-relay-pool, published on 1 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.\nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0224 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- nostr-relay-pool (crates.io): affected from 0.0.0-0; fixed in 0.44.2\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/index.md)","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0224","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/index.md","name":"RUSTSEC-2026-0224","record":{"aliases":["GHSA-f96q-5f6p-v7cj"],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"upgrade","impacts":["data_modify","security_bypass"],"network_reachable":"yes","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Nostr relay library","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Attackers can inject forged Nostr events into trusted databases by exploiting a verification cache flaw, bypassing signature checks.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"security_feature_bypass"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"The `nostr-relay-pool` crate cached the result of event signature verification\nbefore the check was actually performed. Because the entry was inserted\nunconditionally, a first delivery whose signature failed was still recorded\nin the cache. A subsequent delivery of the same event (identical ID,\nbut with a forged signature) would then hit the cache, causing signature\nverification to be skipped entirely. The forged event was passed on to\n`NostrDatabase::save_event()` as if it had been validated.\n\nApplications that connect to untrusted or compromised Nostr relays and persist\nreceived events are vulnerable. An attacker can inject arbitrary events\nwithout a valid signature into the application's trusted database, enabling\nimpersonation of any public key or corruption of application state derived from\nstored events.\n\nThe issue does not compromise confidentiality or availability. It solely\nundermines the integrity of stored event data.\n\nThe fix, released in version 0.44.2, moves the cache insertion to occur only\nafter a successful signature verification, so that failed attempts never create\na cache entry.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and reported by [Ali Al-Sorehi](https://github.com/aykoooo)","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":true,"headline":"Verification cache poisoning allows forged Nostr events to bypass signature validation","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0224","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"security_feature_bypass","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":["0.44.2"],"introduced":["0.0.0-0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"nostr-relay-pool","purl":"pkg:cargo/nostr-relay-pool","source":"RUSTSEC-2026-0224"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-01","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"open","licence":"CC0 1.0","name":"RustSec","prefix":"RUSTSEC"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Attackers can inject forged Nostr events into trusted databases by exploiting a verification cache flaw, bypassing signature checks.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/"}