# RUSTSEC-2026-0224: Verification cache poisoning allows forged Nostr events to bypass signature validation

> Attackers can inject forged Nostr events into trusted databases by exploiting a verification cache flaw, bypassing signature checks.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Not needed
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** Not needed
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 1 Aug 2026
- **Also known as:** GHSA-f96q-5f6p-v7cj

## What is RUSTSEC-2026-0224?

RUSTSEC-2026-0224 is a vulnerability in nostr-relay-pool, published on 1 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

### Official description

The `nostr-relay-pool` crate cached the result of event signature verification
before the check was actually performed. Because the entry was inserted
unconditionally, a first delivery whose signature failed was still recorded
in the cache. A subsequent delivery of the same event (identical ID,
but with a forged signature) would then hit the cache, causing signature
verification to be skipped entirely. The forged event was passed on to
`NostrDatabase::save_event()` as if it had been validated.

Applications that connect to untrusted or compromised Nostr relays and persist
received events are vulnerable. An attacker can inject arbitrary events
without a valid signature into the application's trusted database, enabling
impersonation of any public key or corruption of application state derived from
stored events.

The issue does not compromise confidentiality or availability. It solely
undermines the integrity of stored event data.

The fix, released in version 0.44.2, moves the cache insertion to occur only
after a successful signature verification, so that failed attempts never create
a cache entry.

## Credit

Discovered and reported by [Ali Al-Sorehi](https://github.com/aykoooo)

## Which versions are affected by RUSTSEC-2026-0224?

1 open source package ship an affected version, including nostr-relay-pool.


| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `nostr-relay-pool` | crates.io | From 0.0.0-0 | 0.44.2 |

## How do I fix RUSTSEC-2026-0224?

Upgrade nostr-relay-pool to 0.44.2 or later.

## Is RUSTSEC-2026-0224 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0224 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for RUSTSEC-2026-0224 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: RUSTSEC-2026-0224 is a vulnerability in nostr-relay-pool, published on 1 Aug 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0224 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected packages and fixed versions:
- nostr-relay-pool (crates.io): affected from 0.0.0-0; fixed in 0.44.2

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0224

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0224/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.