{"answers":{"affected":"1 open source package ship an affected version, including lockfree.","exploited":"There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0284 in the wild and no public exploit code.","fix":"No fix has been published for RUSTSEC-2026-0284 yet. Limit exposure of the affected software until one is available.","what":"RUSTSEC-2026-0284 is an use after free vulnerability in lockfree, published on 26 Aug 2026."},"fix_prompt":"Check this codebase for RUSTSEC-2026-0284 and fix it if it is affected.\n\nWhat it is: RUSTSEC-2026-0284 is an use after free vulnerability in lockfree, published on 26 Aug 2026. \nExploitation: There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0284 in the wild and no public exploit code.\n\nAffected packages and fixed versions:\n- lockfree (crates.io): affected from 0.0.0-0; no fix listed\n\nTask:\n1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.\n2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.\n3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.\n4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.\n5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.\n\nReference: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0284/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0284/index.md)","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0284","markdown":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0284/index.md","name":"RUSTSEC-2026-0284","record":{"aliases":[],"analysis":{"component_type":"library","fix_type":"no_fix_stated","impacts":["code_execution","denial_of_service"],"network_reachable":"unknown","non_default_config":false,"product_category":"Rust concurrent data structures","requires_auth":"none","summary":"Safe Rust code can trigger double frees or use uninitialized memory in concurrent data structures, potentially leading to crashes or arbitrary code execution.","user_interaction":"not_required","vuln_class":"use_after_free"},"analysis_generated_by":"qwen3.8-flash-next","assigner":null,"cpe":[],"cvss":{"score":null,"severity":null,"source":null,"vector":null,"version":null},"cwes":[],"description":"Two independent soundness problems, both reachable from safe Rust.\n\n`Map::into_iter` drops `builder` (the caller-supplied hasher `H`) and `incin` by\nhand, then commits the ownership transfer with `mem::forget(self)`. `H::drop` is\nuser code and may panic. If it does, `mem::forget(self)` is skipped and the\nstill-live `Map` unwinds, whose field drop glue destroys `builder` a second\ntime. An empty map is enough — no entries or concurrency required.\n\n`SharedIncin::clear` writes `mem::uninitialized::\u003cArc\u003c_\u003e\u003e()` into `self.inner`\nbefore taking the real `Arc` out. `Arc` has a validity invariant, so this is\nundefined behaviour at the point of creation, with no panic or concurrency\ninvolved. Between that write and the repairing one, `self.inner` also holds\ngarbage while `self` is still droppable, so an unwind from `incin.clear()` or\n`Arc::new` decrements a refcount through an uninitialized pointer. The\n`make_shared_incin!` macro is instantiated five times, so this covers `queue`,\n`stack`, `map`, `channel::spmc` and `channel::mpmc`.\n\n## Impact\n\n* CWE-415 (Double Free): the same allocation is freed twice.\n* CWE-416 (Use-After-Free): a freed allocation is accessed during a repeated `Drop`.\n* CWE-908 (Use of Uninitialized Resource): an `Arc` is constructed from uninitialized bytes.\n\n## Fix\n\nNo fixed release is available. The crate has had no release since 2018-11-18 and\nthe maintainer has not responded to the report.","ecosystems":["crates.io"],"exploits":{"exploitdb":null,"first_seen":null,"github_poc":null,"max_poc_stars":null,"metasploit":null,"nuclei":null,"refs":[],"tier":null},"has_fix":false,"headline":"Double free in `Map::into_iter` and an uninitialized `Arc` in `SharedIncin::clear`","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0284","indexable":true,"kev":null,"kind":"advisory","links":{"ecosystem":"crates.io","product":null,"products":[],"type":"use_after_free","year":"2026"},"n_packages":1,"n_references":null,"packages":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","fixed":[],"introduced":["0.0.0-0"],"last_affected":[],"package":"lockfree","purl":"pkg:cargo/lockfree","source":"RUSTSEC-2026-0284"}],"products":null,"published":"2026-08-26","related":[],"sources":[{"class":"open","licence":"CC0 1.0","name":"RustSec","prefix":"RUSTSEC"}],"ssvc":{"automatable":null,"exploitation":null,"technical_impact":null},"state":null,"updated":null,"vendors":null},"summary":"Safe Rust code can trigger double frees or use uninitialized memory in concurrent data structures, potentially leading to crashes or arbitrary code execution.","url":"https://insights.sbomify.com/RUSTSEC-2026-0284/"}