RUSTSEC-2026-0311 Stack overflow on deeply nested LaTeX input

Not scored Published

Attackers can crash applications using the latex-rust library by submitting deeply nested LaTeX input, causing a stack overflow and process abort.

Exploited in the wild
Not known
Login needed
Not needed
Attackable
Over the internet
Victim action needed
Not needed
Fix
Available

What is RUSTSEC-2026-0311?

RUSTSEC-2026-0311 is a denial of service vulnerability in latex-rust, published on 27 Sep 2026. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, with no action from the victim.

Official description

The parser and layout engine in affected versions of latex-rust recurse once per level of nesting with no limit. Deeply nested input, such as \frac{1}{…}, braces, \sqrt{…}, \left(, or superscripts nested hundreds or thousands of levels deep, exhausts the call stack.

A stack overflow in Rust aborts the process. It is not a panic, so it cannot be caught with catch_unwind. A program that renders LaTeX from untrusted input can therefore be terminated by a short string. With a release build on an 8 MiB stack, 700 nested \frac{1}{…} (about 7 KB of input) abort version 1.0.4, and 10,000 nested braces (about 20 KB) abort it as well. The threshold is lower on smaller stacks and in debug builds; on a 2 MiB thread in a debug build, about 35 nested fractions are enough.

let mut src = String::from("1");
for _ in 0..700 {
    src = format!("\\frac{{1}}{{{src}}}");
}
let _ = latex_rust::parse(&src); // stack overflow, process aborts

The fixed versions count nesting depth in the parser and in layout and refuse input that nests more than 32 levels. parse, parse_with_colors, and the latex_to_* functions return ParseError::Malformed("input nests deeper than 32 levels"), and layout returns Error::Unsupported { what: "tree nests deeper than 32 levels" } for a tree built by hand. The count is of parser recursion levels, and a braced argument costs two, so the limit admits 15 nested \frac, \sqrt, or x^{…}, and 31 nested groups, \left…\right pairs, or environments. Input past the limit is refused within about 100 KiB of stack in an optimised build.

Version 1.0.5 fixes this with no API changes and is a drop-in replacement for 1.0.4; upgrade with cargo update -p latex-rust. It also includes the 2.0.0 rendering fixes, so rendered output differs from 1.0.4. Versions 2.0.0 and 2.0.1 contain the same fix, with the same limit and messages, together with breaking API changes relative to 1.x, and also let callers change the limit with ParseOptions and layout_with_max_depth.

Which versions are affected by RUSTSEC-2026-0311?

1 open source package ship an affected version, including latex-rust.

PackageAffectedFixed in
latex-rust crates.ioFrom 0.0.0-01.0.5

How do I fix RUSTSEC-2026-0311?

Upgrade latex-rust to 1.0.5 or later.

Upgrade, then put limits on request size, rate and nesting depth so one client cannot exhaust the service. More about Denial of service.

Is RUSTSEC-2026-0311 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of RUSTSEC-2026-0311 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Sources

Is RUSTSEC-2026-0311 in your software?

Upload an SBOM and sbomify checks it against every vulnerability here, every day.

Check your SBOMs for free