# openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1: Security update for enigmail

> Attackers can spoof signed email status by sending unsigned MIME parts, bypassing Enigmail's integrity verification features.

- **Severity:** Not scored
- **Exploited in the wild:** Not known
- **Login needed:** Not needed
- **Attackable:** Over the internet
- **Victim action needed:** A user has to click or open something
- **Fix available:** Yes
- **Published:** 27 Feb 2020

## What is openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1?

openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 is a vulnerability in enigmail, published on 27 Feb 2020. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.

### Official description

This update for enigmail fixes the following issues:

enigmail was updated to 2.1.5:

* Security issue: unsigned MIME parts displayed as signed (bsc#1159973)
* Ensure that upgrading GnuPG 2.0.x to 2.2.x upgrade converts keyring format
* Make Enigmail Compatible with Protected-Headers spec, draft 2

enigmail 2.1.4:

* Fixes for UI glitches
* Option to 'Attach public key to messages' was not restored properly

enigmail 2.1.3:

* fix a bug in the setup wizard that could lead the wizard to
  never complete scanning the inbox

This update was imported from the SUSE:SLE-15:Update update project.

## Which versions are affected by openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1?


| Package | Ecosystem | Affected | Fixed in |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `enigmail` | openSUSE:Leap 15.1 | All versions | 2.1.5-lp151.2.9.1 |

## How do I fix openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1?

Upgrade to a fixed version.

## Is openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 being exploited?

There is no known exploitation of openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 in the wild and no public exploit code.

## Fix prompt for AI coding agents

```text
Check this codebase for openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 and fix it if it is affected.

What it is: openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 is a vulnerability in enigmail, published on 27 Feb 2020. An attacker can exploit it over the internet without logging in, and only if a user opens a file or follows a link.
Exploitation: There is no known exploitation of openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1 in the wild and no public exploit code.

Affected product: enigmail. No package-level version data is available, so check the vendor advisory linked from the reference page.

Task:
1. Search the dependency manifests and lockfiles (for example package.json, package-lock.json, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, uv.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle, go.mod, Cargo.lock, Gemfile.lock) and any Dockerfiles for the affected packages, including transitive dependencies.
2. If an affected version is in use, upgrade it to the fixed version for its release line with the project's package manager, so the lockfile is regenerated. Prefer the smallest upgrade that fixes it.
3. If there is no fix, or the upgrade would break the build, do not guess: explain the risk and the safest workaround instead.
4. Run the tests and summarise what changed and why.
5. If nothing in the project is affected, say so and change nothing.

Reference: https://insights.sbomify.com/openSUSE-SU-2020-0250-1/ (Markdown: https://insights.sbomify.com/openSUSE-SU-2020-0250-1/index.md)
```

## Sources

- OSV: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/openSUSE-SU-2020:0250-1

---
From sbomify Insights: https://insights.sbomify.com/openSUSE-SU-2020-0250-1/
Summaries are generated and may contain mistakes; the official description above is the record.
